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ARKANSAS SURFERS AND THEIR PRIVACY, OR LACK THEREOF:
DOES THE COMMON LAW INVASION OF PRIVACY TORT
PROHIBIT E-TAILERS' USE OF "COOKIES"?
Bryan T. McKinney*
Dwayne Whitten"
That the individual shall have full protection in person and in property
is a principle as old as the common law; but it has been found necessary
from time to time to define anew the exact nature and extent of such pro-
tection. Political, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of
new rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the
demands of society.,
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine the anachronism of Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, relax-
ing in the privacy of their Boston law office, surfing the Internet in the late
nineteenth century. Perhaps they would log on to a Web site seeking direc-
tions to an upcoming vacation destination. Perhaps they would seek infor-
mation regarding the week's weather forecast. Perhaps they would conduct
a few hours of legal research, utilizing the many Web sites designed for this
very purpose. If they understood the potential privacy ramifications of their
actions, perhaps Warren and Brandeis would not surf the Internet at all.
Warren and Brandeis's seminal article was prompted by what they saw as
the excesses of a press empowered by increasingly sophisticated technol-
ogy. Warren and Brandeis argued that the increasing pace of modern life
and the technology associated with it tended to decrease individual privacy,
but at the same time increase the individual's desire for it:
The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civiliza-
tion, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man, un-
der the refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive to pub-
licity, so that solitude and privacy have become more essential to the in-
dividual, but modem enterprise and invention have, through invasions
* General Counsel and Assistant Professor of Business Law, Ouachita Baptist Univer-
sity. The author would like to thank his current colleagues at Ouachita Baptist University,
and his former colleagues at the McMillan, Turner, McCorkle, and Curry Law Firm for their
encouragement and support.
** Assistant Professor of Information Systems, Ouachita Baptist University.
I. With these words, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, then law partners, intro-
duced one of the most influential law review articles ever written, wherein they argued that
the common law should protect an individual's right to privacy. See Samuel Warren & Louis
D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 193 (1890).
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upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater
than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.
2
The same phenomenon still occurs. A modern example is what some
consider the invasion of privacy that occurs when companies engaging in
Internet commerce place monitoring information on their customers' com-
puters, without their knowledge or consent. This practice, which involves
the use of"cookies," is the subject of this article.
Several plaintiffs have recently filed unsuccessful lawsuits in federal
court alleging that the use of cookies violates various federal laws.3 In both
In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litigation and Chance v. Avenue A, Inc., the
plaintiffs alleged violations of federal law, as well as the common law tort
of invasion of privacy. However, in both cases, the courts dismissed the
federal claims, and subsequently refused to exercise supplemental jurisdic-
tion over plaintiffs' remaining state common law invasion of privacy
claims.
In the context of individual privacy rights, this article will briefly con-
sider the basic functions of the Internet and will then focus on the use of
cookies by various Web-enabled companies.5 Once a "rudimentary grasp"
of the "architecture and engineering" of the Internet has been achieved, 6 it
should be readily apparent that although the Internet offers society tremen-
dous benefits, the Internet also presents complex questions regarding indi-
vidual privacy rights.7
After a brief consideration of the In re DoubleClick and Chance cases,
this article will consider in some detail whether or not the use of cookies
could give rise to a successful lawsuit alleging the Arkansas common law
2. Id. at 196.
3. See, e.g., Chance v. Avenue A, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153 (W.D. Wash. 2001); In re
DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litigation, 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
4. See Chance, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1163 (noting that once the federal claims are dis-
missed, "novel and complex issues of state law predominate"); In re DoubleClick, 154 F.
Supp. 2d at 526 ("[W]e have dismissed plaintiffs' federal claims which were the sole predi-
cate for federal jurisdiction .... We decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plain-
tiffs' state law claims.").
5. The concept of cookies will be addressed in further detail in Part H, but a brief defi-
nition may prove helpful. A cookie is defined as "[a] very small text file placed on your hard
drive by a Web Page server." Microsoft Corporation, Cookies: What They Are, Why You Are
In Charge, at http://www.microsoft.com/info/cookies.htm (last updated Nov. 2, 1999). Web
browser software can use these cookie files to store specific information such as consumer
name, products previously viewed on a site, and user names. Web servers can later access
and use this data for a variety of purposes.
6. In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 500-01. Judge Buchwald noted that
"[a]lthough a comprehensive description of the Internet is unnecessary to address the issues
... a rudimentary grasp of its architecture and engineering is important." Id.
7. See, e.g., Jerry Berman & Deirdre Mulligan, Privacy in the Digital Age: Work in
Progress, 23 NOVA L. REv. 551 (1999).
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tort of invasion of privacy.8 This is an issue yet to be addressed by Arkansas
courts, and as of the date of this writing, the 'authors of this article have
found no published case law addressing the issue of whether the use of
cookies violates an Internet user's common law right to privacy. Currently,
federal law provides little relief to consumers who feel aggrieved by a Web-
based retailer's use of cookies; however, one could argue that the use of
cookies violates an Internet user's common-law right to privacy as defined
by Arkansas courts.
II. BRIEF SURVEY OF THE INTERNET
In the current business environment, companies are increasingly rely-
ing on the collection, processing, and use of information related to consum-
ers. Some of the more promising business uses of this data include targeted
marketing, increased convenience of electronic commerce, and customized
customer service, support, and Web pages in general. 9 Personal information
can be gathered from product warrantees, retail scanners, automobile regis-
tration, and Web site visits, among other methods. Of particular importance
is the data collected via the Web.10
Consumer data collected via the Web can enhance Web-based retailing
efforts ("E-tailing"), providing the opportunity to employ a dynamic, real
time, micro-marketing approach. As Internet usage continues to grow, E-
tailing is becoming an increasingly important electronic business applica-
tion. " A 1998 Internet survey reported that nearly one-half of all respon-
dents reported purchasing products online at least once per month 2
The infomediary 13 industry has emerged to assist in the application of
the consumer data that is gathered. Gathering customer data is an infomedi-
8. For a thorough and thoughtful analysis of Arkansas law regarding the tort of inva-
sion of privacy, see John J. Watkins, The Privacy Tort: An Arkansas Guide, 1993 ARK. L.
NoTEs 91.
9. Stephen F. Ambrose, Jr. & Joseph W. Gelb, Consumer Privacy Regulation and
Litigation, 56 Bus. LAW. 1157, 1157 (2001).
10. See George R. Milne & Andrew J. Rohm, Consumer Privacy and Name Removal
Across Direct Marketing Channels: Exploring Opt-In and Opt-Out Alternatives, 19 J. PUB.
POL'Y & MARKETING 238, 238 (2000).
11. See J. Yannis Bakos, The Emerging Role of Electronic Marketplaces on the Internet,
41 COMM. Ass'N COMPUTING MACHINERY 35, 35 (1998); see also Varun Grover & James
Teng, E-Commerce and the Information Market, 44 CoMM. Ass'N COMPUTING MACHINERY
79, 79 (2001).
12. Georgia Tech Research Corp., Frequency of Purchasing Online, at http://www.
gvu.gatech.edu/user-surveys/survey-1 998-10/graphs/shopping/ql24.htm (Oct. 1998).
13. "Infomediaries" are companies that collect consumer profile data, store the data, and
then analyze the data to build customer profiles. These profiles can be used to create custom
marketing efforts on Web pages as Web users visit Web sites. The term "infomediary" is
derived from the concatenation of information and intermediary, ultimately meaning "a
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ary's first function.' 4 The data may be gathered in a number of ways. Cus-
tomer registration on Web sites is the easiest and least expensive method.
Companies may provide incentives such as the chance to win a prize, the
offer of free software, or the opportunity to play an online game to motivate
a potential customer to complete the form. Other sites may require a regis-
tration process before accessing the services available on that particular site.
The well-known Internet research company Gartner Group uses this tactic,
requiring users to complete a registration form before accessing the research
published on their site.'S
In addition to collecting data from their own Web visitors, companies
can purchase data from other companies that also use online forms or col-
lect data via cookies.' 6 Cookies can be used to store specific information,
which a Web server can later retrieve.' 7 Specific examples of cookie use
include:
" Storing a list of items in a virtual shopping cart until the consumer is
ready to complete the transaction. This is more efficient than the Web
server storing the data, since thousands of people may be shopping on
the site at the same time;
* Storing consumer names so that consumers can be greeted with a cus-
tomized message when they make a return visit to a particular site;
" Logging the pages that have been visited on a particular Web site;
" Storing the type of information requested from the site;
* Storing the product pages viewed; and
" Storing usernames and passwords.'
8
The privacy issue arises by virtue of the fact that cookies may be cre-
ated without the consent of or disclosure to the visitor. The data collection
methods discussed so far may offer benefits to E-tailers such as providing
some personal data and a minimal amount of past online behavior. While
this data is useful in predicting future purchasing decisions, a complete con-
sumer knowledge base requires more extensive demographic and lifestyle
data. Infomediaries offer supplemental data that is based on consumer pro-
files from national offline consumer database compiler companies such as
Polk Company in Southfield, Michigan, and Naviant in Newtown Square,
company that utilizes information in a process involving at least two other entities."
14. See Table 1, infra p. 755.
15. Gartner, Inc., Privacy Policy, at http://www3.gartner.con/6_help/18a.html (last
visited Feb. 10, 2002).
16. H.M. DEITEL ET AL., E-BuSINESS AND E-CoMMERCE FOR MANAGERS 751 (2001); see
supra note 5 (defining "cookie").
17. Microsoft Corporation, supra note 5.
18. In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litigation, 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 502-03 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
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Pennsylvania. These companies collect and organize data from sources such
as credit card companies, censuses, surveys, product registration and war-
ranty cards, and vehicle registrations. The table below provides a more com-
plete listing of demographic and behavioral attributes that are included in
the infomediary knowledge bases.
Table 1: Examples of Consumer Data Stored




Family demographics 0 Number of adults and children in household
0 Owner/renter
0 Length at residence
0 Occupation







Automotive 0 Type of car
* Number and age of vehicles owned
High tech 0 Computer
* Cell phone
* Reference and educational software
* Pager
0 Games





The companies specializing in consumer profiles sell their data to in-
fomediaries such as Cogit.com, DoubleClick, and Engage Technologies.
These infomediaries may also collect Web activity information from other
companies as well. For example, infomediaries may have agreements with
hundreds of companies that allow the infomediary access to the customer
data they control.
Even past purchasing patterns on given Web sites are available if re-
quested.19 For example, the recent alliance between Cogit.com and the Polk
19. Janis Mara, Cogit.com Service Offers Profiling and Predictions, ADWEEK-E.
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Company has generated data on over 100 million households covering over
1000 demographic attributes.20 Newer releases of the software are based on
consumer demographics, Web activity, purchasing patterns, and customer
interests. Thus, they are able to add considerable knowledge to the process
of suggesting product offerings and promotions of interest to the individual
online.
E-tailers can supplement the knowledge from the infomediary with
their own clickstream data, which is the history of the Web pages a Web
surfer has visited. This data provides a valuable source of information about
the current behavior of site visitors, especially point-of-sale data, which
details the products purchased. Another source of information is log files.
These files tell where visitors are coming from, what they do while on the
site, and where and when they leave. By integrating data from these two
sources with the infomediary knowledge, E-tailers have an even more accu-
rate model of predicted visitor behaviors. Companies such as America
Online and Columbia House are already combining purchased consumer
data with their customer data to build their own customer knowledge bases.
Some companies in turn sell this online data to infomediaries or information
vendors who may in turn sell to infomediaries. Over time, this process
makes the knowledge of an individual consumer's behavior more valuable
to all E-tailers using infomediaries.
Data collection is constrained by privacy laws in the European Union
(EU), resulting in a reduced scope for data collection by infomediaries. 21
Published reports of information abuses and EU privacy laws have led to an
increased concern about online privacy in the United States as well. Al-
though some sites publish their privacy policies and provide E-verification
company logos and symbols, privacy remains a critical issue. According to
a recent Gallup Poll survey, seventy-eight percent of respondents are con-
cerned about personal privacy when online, and seventy-one percent of in-
dividuals are concerned with the use of cookies.22
United States companies are limited in the collection of data involving
transactions from the EU countries due to the European Community Direc-
tive on Data Protection 95/46/EC.23 These standards for EU countries, di-
EDITION, Mar. 13, 2000, at 44.
20. Cogit.com, at http://www.directionsmag.com/pressreleases.asp?PressID-=1039 (last
visited Mar. 1, 2002).
21. See generally Michael Fjetland, Global Commerce and the Privacy Clash, INFO.
MGMT. J., Jan.-Feb. 2002, at 54.
22. Online Privacy Concerns Continue to Linger, COMMUNITY BANKER, Sept. 2001, at
44, 46.
23. Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31. The Directive went into effect on
October 28, 1998. Donna Gillin, Safe Harbor Principles for the European Privacy Directive
Are Finalized, MARKETING RES., Winter 2000, at 41, 41.
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rected at the online privacy of personal data, are more stringent than those
in the United States. Personal data on citizens of EU countries cannot be
exported to countries that do not have similar privacy protection. 24 In re-
sponse to this directive, the United States Department of Commerce worked
with the EU to develop "safe harbors," a set of common principles designed
to provide the minimal level of privacy required for export of data outside
of the EU. The EU accepted these principles as adequate protection on July
27, 2000.25 As a result, companies could once again use the services of in-
fomediaries for EU consumer data, although the infomediaries were limited
in the scope of collectable data.
The process of analyzing a consumer's behavior in comparison with
other consumers who have shown similar purchasing patterns is called col-
laborative filtering.26 Based on this analysis, infomediaries not only share
consumer data and composite profiles, but also share predictions about an
individual consumer's behavior. This knowledge is the basis of customiza-
tion. A list of products that should be of interest to the visitor may be dis-
played on the Web page in a convenient and obvious location.
When a potential customer visits the site, a personally identifiable at-
tribute is sent to the infomediary. This data is checked against the infomedi-
ary knowledge base to determine whether a match exists. Assuming a match
is made, the infomediary submits the consumer's personal data for process-
ing in the decision model. This subset of data is then stripped of any per-
sonal identification in efforts to protect individual privacy. Next, the info-
mediary processes the data to determine the best fit of the individual to the
market segment. Then, based on past behaviors of consumers in that group,
recommendations 27 are made by the infomediary to the E-tailer on content
for the visitor.28
The process described above relies exclusively on the assimilation and
gathering of data that many consumers deem private. A gap exists between
the current federal legislation and the perception of many Internet users
24. Gillin, supra note 23, at 41.
25. Id.
26. See Gordon A. Wyner, Life (on the Internet) Imitates Research, MARKETING REs.,
Summer 2000, at 38, for a discussion of collaborative filtering.
27. For example, if a particular user's profile consisted of a young male, living in Texas,
owner of a four-wheel drive truck, and his previous Web site visits include Remington Arms
Company, Texas Parks and Wildlife, and Cabela's Outfitter, then a likely banner ad to be
presented on the Web page being visited could be for a hunting retail store. See Remington
Arms Co., Inc., Remington Home Page, at http://www.remington.com/default (last visited
Feb. 10, 2002); Texas Parks & Wildlife, Texas Parks & Wildlife Home Page,
http://www.tpwd.state.tx.us/ (last modified Feb. 9, 2002); Cabela's Inc., Cabela's Online
Store--Quality Hunting, Fishing, Camping, and Outdoor Gear, at http://www.cabelas.com/
(last visited Feb. 10, 2002).
28. Cogit.com, supra note 20.
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regarding what is and is not private domain. In response to this division
between the perception of privacy and the law's protection of privacy, a
number of bills have been introduced in the 107th Congress.29 While each
may attempt to protect privacy in different ways, collectively they may be
thought to combat an Orwellian prophecy whereby an individual's every
move is tracked by businesses for profit concerns.
III. DOUBLECLICK AND CHANCE: PROOF THAT FEDERAL LAWS PROVIDE
LITTLE PROTECTION
Two recent federal cases, In re DoubleClick and Chance v. Avenue A
Inc., illustrate the futility of consumers' reliance upon existing federal laws
to prohibit individual privacy invasions through the use of cookies. This
section examines these two cases, focusing first on the leading case, In re
DoubleClick.
A. In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litigation
The plaintiffs brought a class action against DoubleClick, seeking in-
junctive and monetary relief for injuries allegedly suffered due to Double-
Click's purported illegal conduct. Members of the class were defined as
"[a]ll persons who, since 1/1/96, have had information about them gathered
by DoubleClick as a result of viewing any DoubleClick products or services
on the Internet or who have had DoubleClick 'cookies' . . . placed upon
their computers." 30 The plaintiffs brought three claims arising under federal
law,31 alleging that DoubleClick's actions violated the Stored Communica-
tions Act, 32 the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), 33 and the Federal
29. E.g., Consumer Internet Privacy Enhancement Act of 2001, H.R. 237, 107th Cong.
(2001); see also Electronic Privacy Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 112, 107th Cong. (2001);
Online Privacy Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 89, 107th Cong. (2001); infra note 65. While
these proposed bills seek to protect consumers' on-line privacy interests, governmental re-
sponse to the tragic events of September 11, 2001 will create unique and challenging privacy
considerations. For example, on October 24, 2001, the government enacted the USA Patriot
Act with the following purposes in mind: "to deter and punish terrorist acts in the United
States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and for other
purposes." USA Patriot Act of 2001, Publ. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). While many
will find these goals admirable and even necessary, the realization of these goals is not with-
out privacy ramifications. For example, the Patriot Act significantly expands the federal
government's ability to conduct electronic surveillance. While a thorough analysis of this act
is beyond the scope of this article, the USA Patriot Act does present novel questions for
privacy advocates.
30. In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litigation, 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 500 n. 1 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (quoting plaintiffs' May 26 amended complaint).
31. Id.
32. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (2000). Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy
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Wiretap Act.34 The plaintiffs also brought four state law claims alleging the
common law tort of invasion of privacy, common law unjust enrichment,
common law trespass to property, and violation of two state statutes. 35 The
dispositive motion before the court was defendant's motion to dismiss the
plaintiffs' claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).36
Writing for the court, Judge Buchwald first provided a thoughtful ex-
planation of the Internet and the services offered by DoubleClick, focusing
on targeted banner advertisements and cookie information collection.17 In its
discussion, the court first considered the Stored Communications Act and
determined that its goal was to prevent hackers from obtaining, altering, or
destroying certain stored electronic communications.38 The Act defines the
prohibited conduct as follows:
Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section whoever (1) inten-
tionally accesses without authorization a facility through which an elec-
tronic information service is provided; or (2) intentionally exceeds an
authorization to access that facility; and thereby obtains ... access to a
wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage in such
39system shall be punished ....
The Stored Communications Act also provides an important exception:
"Subsection (a) of this section does not apply with respect to conduct au-
Act is referred to as the "Stored Communications Act."
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
34. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000).
35. In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 500. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged viola-
tions of sections 349(a) and 350 of article 22A of the New York General Business Laws. See
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 349(a), 350 (McKinney 1988) (providing protection from deceptive
acts and practices).
36. In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 500; see FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
37. In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 500-05. Generally, the court explained that
DoubleClick's process of targeting banner advertisements involves three participants (the
user, the DoubleClick-affiliated Web site, and the DoubleClick server). Id. at 503. This proc-
ess involves four steps, which the court outlined as follows: (1) the user seeks access to a
Web site affiliated with DoubleClick, at which time the user's browser requests that site's
homepage; (2) the site processes the request, sends a copy of the page (minus any banner
advertisements), and sends an Internet Provider (IP) link to the DoubleClick server that in-
structs the user's computer to automatically send a communication to DoubleClick; (3) the
user's computer sends a communication to DoubleClick containing such information as a
cookie identification number, the Web site that the user accessed, and the type of browser
that the user has; and (4) DoubleClick uses this information to identify the user's profile and
to determine what advertisements it will send to the user, then sends a communication to the
user's computer containing the banner advertisements. Id. at 503-04. Another thorough de-
scription of the Internet may be found in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
38. See In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 507.
39. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2000).
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thorized . . . by a user of that [wire or electronic communications] service
with respect to a communication of or intended for that user...."
After a thorough analysis of the Stored Communications Act,4' the
court concluded that the "plaintiffs' GET, POST and GIF submissions are
excepted from § 2701(c)(2) because they are 'intended for' [only those]
DoubleClick-affiliated Web sites who have authorized DoubleClick's ac-
cess." 42 The court determined that the cookie identification numbers sent to
DoubleClick from the plaintiffs' computers "fall outside of Title II's protec-
tion because they are not in 'electronic storage."'' 43 Had this information
been in electronic storage, DoubleClick would have been authorized to ac-
cess "its own communications.
'"
Having discarded the Title II Stored Communications Act claim, the
court moved on to consider the Wiretap Act.45 Consistent with the Stored
Communications Act, the Wiretap Act also provides a relevant prohibition
and an exception.46 The Wiretap Act provides for a private right of action
against
any person who ... intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or
procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire,
40. Id. § 2701(c).
41. See In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 507-13. For a concise, helpful discussion
of the Stored Communications Act, see Holly K. Towle & Aimee Arost, Online Liability:
Digital Boundaries, at 177, in SEVENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series,
PLI Order No. GO-00PS/2, 2001).
42. In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 513. The court explained what GET, POST,
and GIF submissions are:
GET information is submitted as part of a Web site's address or "URL," in
what is known as a "query string." For example, a request for a hypothetical
online record store's selection of Bon Jovi albums might read:
http://recordstore.hypothetical.com/search?terms=bonjovi. The URL query
string begins with the "?" character meaning the cookie would record that the
user requested information about Bon Jovi.
Users submit POST information when they fill in multiple blank fields on a
Webpage. For example, if a user signed up for an online discussion group, he
might have to fill in fields with his name, address, email address, phone number
and discussion group alias. The cookie would capture this submitted POST in-
formation.
Finally, DoubleClick places GIF tags on its affiliated Web sites. GIF tags are
the size of a single pixel and are invisible to users. Unseen, they record the us-
ers' movements throughout the affiliated Web site, enabling DoubleClick to
learn what information the user sought and viewed.
Id. at 504.
43. Id. at 513.
44. Id. at 513-14.
45. See id. at 514.
46. DoubleClick conceded that its actions, as pleaded, violated this prohibition. Id.
760 [Vol. 24
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oral, or electronic communication .... [However) . . . [i]t shall not be
unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color of law to
intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where such person is
a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the commu-
nication has given prior consent to such interception unless such com-
munication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or
tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States
or any State.
47
The court determined that DoubleClick was entitled to take advantage
of the exception in 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) because DoubleClick and its
affiliated Web sites are "parties to the communication[s]" as defined in the
exception.48 The only remaining issue in the Wiretap Act claim was whether
or not DoubleClick's actions were conducted for the purpose of committing
any criminal or tortious act. Looking to the legislative history and case law
interpreting this section,49 the court found as a matter of law that the plain-
tiffs failed to show that DoubleClick acted with a tortious purpose.5 0
The court then turned its attention to the CFAA. 5' Section 1030(g)
stated the following:
Any person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of this
section may maintain a civil action against the violator to obtain com-
pensatory damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief ....
Damages for violations involving damage as defined in section (e)(8)(A)
are limited to economic damages .... 52
47. 18 U.S.C § 2511 (2000) (emphasis added).
48. In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 514.
49. The court explained that "[s]ection 2511(2)(d)'s legislative history and caselaw
make clear that the 'criminal' or 'tortious' purpose requirement is to be construed narrowly,
covering only acts accompanied by a specific contemporary intention to commit a crime or
tort." Id. at 515. Quoting Sussman v. ABC, 186 F.3d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir. 1999), the court
stated that under this section
the focus is not upon whether the interception itself violated another law; it is
upon whether the purpose for interception-its intended use-was criminal or
tortious .... Although ABC's taping may well have been a tortious invasion un-
der state law, plaintiffs have produced no probative evidence that ABC had an il-
legal or tortious purpose when it made the tape.
In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 516. For examples of other cases addressing tortious
purpose, see Deteresa v. ABC, 121 F.3d 460 (9th Cir. 1997); JH. Desnick v. ABC, 44 F.3d
1345 (7th Cir. 1995); Boddie v. ABC, 881 F.2d 267 (6th Cir. 1989).
50. See In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 519.
51. Seeid. at519-20.
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 814(e), 115 Stat.




Section 1030(e)(8) defined "damage" as
any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a sys-
tem, or information that-(A) causes loss aggregating at least $5000 in
value during any 1-year period to one or more individuals; (B) modifies
or impairs, or potentially modifies or impairs, the medical examination,
diagnosis, treatment, or care of one or more individuals; (C) causes
physical injury to any person; (D) threatens public health or safety.
53
The plaintiffs argued that the $5000 minimum should be calculated in
the aggregate, not individually, but the court disagreed with the proposed
aggregation.54 The court later concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove
the losses and damages caused by DoubleClick's access to a single com-
puter over one year's time could meet § 1030(e)(8)(A)'s $5000 require-
ment.55 As previously mentioned, upon the disposal of the federal law
claims, the court refused to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state
law claims.
56
B. Chance v. Avenue A, Inc.
The Chance case is quite similar to the In re DoubleClick case.57 The
plaintiffs (again, in a class action) alleged that the defendant's unauthorized
placement of cookies on plaintiffs' computers enabled the defendant "to
monitor [their] electronic communications without plaintiffs' knowledge,
A civil action for a violation of this section may be brought only if the conduct
involved 1 of the factors set forth in clause (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), or (v) of subsection
(a)(5)(B). Damages for a violation involving only conduct described in subsec-
tion (a)(5)(B)(i) are limited to economic damages.
§ 814(e), 115 Stat. at 384.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(8), amended by Pub. L. No. 107-56. § 814(d)(3), 115 Stat. 272,
384 (2001). Section 1030(e)(8) now simply defines "damage" as "any impairment to the
integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information." § 814(d)(3), 115 Stat.
at 384. Subsection (a)(5)(B)(i) of § 1030 now sets out the circumstances under which eco-
nomic damages are recoverable:
Whoever... by conduct described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) of subparagraph (A),
caused (or, in the case of an attempted offense, would, if completed, have
caused) . . . loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period (and, for pur-
poses of an investigation, prosecution, or other proceeding brought by the United
States only, loss resulting from a related course of conduct affecting 1 or more
other protected computers) aggregating at least $5,000 in value.
Id. § 814(a)(4), 115 Stat. at 383.
54. See In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 519-26.
55. Id. at 526.
56. Id.; see also supra note 4.
57. Compare Chance v. Avenue A, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153 (W.D. Wash. 2001), with
In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d 497.
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authorization, or consent., 58 In Chance, the plaintiffs also alleged the de-
fendant violated the Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications Act, and the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, in addition to various state law claims. 59 At
issue before the court were the defendant's motion for summary judgment
and the plaintiffs' motion to strike portions of declarations and motion for
summary judgment.60 Relying heavily on the In re DoubleClick case, the
court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment.6'
Given the courts' recent interpretation of federal law, it appears that
plaintiffs will struggle to assert valid claims against companies such as
DoubleClick based on the Stored Communications Act,62 the CFAA, 63 and
the Federal Wiretap Act.64 Until Congress adopts a more stringent federal
law safeguarding consumer privacy on the Internet,65 consumers may, how-
ever, attempt to hold these companies liable for the common law tort of
invasion of privacy. The following section considers whether Arkansas
courts might entertain such a cause of action.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE ARKANSAS TORT OF INVASION OF PRIVACY
There is certainly no excess of case law regarding the invasion of pri-
vacy tort in Arkansas. The first Arkansas case to formally recognize this
58. Chance, 165 F. Supp. 2dat 1155.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1163. The court stated, "Plaintiffs' attorneys have brought nearly identical
claims against other leading digital advertising and media companies such as DoubleClick
and MatchLogic. In a very thorough opinion, the District Court for the Southern District of
New York recently dismissed with prejudice a virtually identical claim against DoubleClick
under Rule 12(b)(6)." Id. at 1155. Cf In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 497. Because of
the similarity between the two opinions, further discussion regarding Chance is not merited.
62. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2000); see supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001); see
supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
64. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000); see supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
65. See, e.g., Consumer Internet Privacy Act of 2001, H.R. 237, 107th Cong. (2001).
This bill would render illegal the practice of commercial Web site operators collecting per-
sonally identifiable information online from users of that Web site unless the operator pro-
vides (1) notice to the user of the Web site and (2) an opportunity to that user to limit the use
of marketing purposes, or disclosure to third parties of personally identifiable information
collected. Id.; see also Online Privacy Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 89, 107th Cong. (2001).
Developed to protect those individuals not covered by the Children's Online Privacy Protec-
tion Act of 1998, this Act would make it unlawful for a Web site operator or online service to
collect, use, or disclose various personal information without appropriate notice and other
safeguards. Online Privacy Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 89, 107th Cong. (2001); see Chil-
dren's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 1301 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (2000)).
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privacy tort is Olan Mills, Inc. v. Dodd,66 decided in 1962. In his opinion,
Justice McFaddin acknowledged, "[w]hile there is a dearth of case law in
Arkansas on the point, there are cases, textbook writings, and law review
articles elsewhere.,
67
In the forty years since Justice McFaddin's opinion, Arkansas courts
have had relatively few opportunities to address invasion of privacy
claims.68 Nonetheless, Arkansas courts have provided adequate guidance to
practitioners by indicating the courts' acceptance of the four categories of
invasion of privacy as adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Torts.69
These four categories are: intrusion upon seclusion; appropriation of name
or likeness; publicity given to private life; and publicity that places a person
in false light.70 Thus, an analysis of existing Arkansas case law, as well as
an analysis of case law originating in other jurisdictions that have also
adopted the Restatement, should provide an adequate framework with which
to consider the privacy issues raised by an E-tailer's use of cookies.
A. Intrusion upon Seclusion
The Restatement explains the tort of intrusion upon seclusion as fol-
lows: "One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject
to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person.",71 The Arkansas Supreme Court
first considered an intrusion upon seclusion claim in CBM v. Bemel.72 In
Bemel, a defendant collection agency repeatedly harassed the plaintiff with
letters (over fifty) and telephone calls (approximately seventy) seeking to
collect a hospital bill representing charges incurred by the plaintiffs child.
Relying on the tort of invasion of privacy, the court affirmed the jury's ver-
dict of $1000 for compensatory damages, and $4000 for punitive damages.
73
66. 234 Ark. 495, 353 S.W.2d 22 (1962).
67. Id. at 497, 353 S.W.2d at 23.
68. See, e.g., Dunlap v. McCarty, 284 Ark. 5, 678 S.W.2d 361 (1984); CBM v. Bemel,
274 Ark. 223, 623 S.W.2d 518 (1981); Dodrill v. Ark. Democrat Co., 265 Ark. 628, 590
S.W.2d 840 (1979).
69. See, e.g., Dunlap, 284 Ark. 5, 678 S.W.2d 361; Dodrill, 265 Ark. 628, 590 S.W.2d
840.
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
71. Id. § 652B.
72. 274 Ark. 223,623 S.W.2d 518 (1981).
73. Id. at 224, 623 S.W.2d 519. In addition to the letters and telephone calls, the plain-
tiff claimed an employee of the defendant represented that he worked for the prosecuting
attorney's office. Perhaps this representation played a role in the punitive damage award. See
id., 623 S.W.2d 519.
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Shortly after the Bemel decision, the Arkansas Supreme Court had an-
other opportunity, in Dunlap v. McCarty,74 to consider a case wherein the
plaintiff alleged the privacy tort of intrusion upon seclusion.75 Though the
court concluded the plaintiffs claim was barred by the statute of limitations,
the case helped further develop the Arkansas privacy tort. In Dunlap, the
court acknowledged that
the Restatement... gives five examples of invasion of privacy by intru-
sion, which are briefly: a reporter takes plaintiff's picture in a hospital
room against plaintiff's wishes; a detective looks into plaintiffs win-
dows; a detective wiretaps plaintiff's phones; the defendant examines
the plaintiffs bank records for evidence in a civil action; and the defen-
dant, a professional photographer, telephones the plaintiff repeatedly to
have her picture made.
76
Comment b is perhaps more helpful than the illustrations when analyz-
ing the unauthorized placement of cookies on one's computer. Comment b
states that:
The invasion may be by physical intrusion into a place in which the
plaintiff has secluded himself. . over the plaintiff's objection .... It
may also be by the use of the defendant's senses, with or without me-
chanical aids, to oversee or overhear the plaintiff's private affairs .... It
may be by some other form of investigation or examination into his pri-
vate concerns .... The intrusion itself makes the defendant subject to li-
ability, even though there is no publication or other use of any kind of
the... information collected.77
An argument could be made that the unauthorized placement of cook-
ies onto one's computer is generally the type of behavior prohibited by
Comment b of the Restatement. The placement of the cookie is a physical
invasion into a place a reasonable person could presume to be secluded.78
Whether or not Internet users are aware that cookies have been placed on
their computers, evidence indicates that most Internet users consider their
actions on the Internet to be private.79
74. 284 Ark. 5, 678 S.W.2d 361 (1984).
75. See id. at 9, 678 S.W.2d at 364 (relying on RESTATEMENT § 652B, illus. 1-5).
76. RESTATEMENT, supra note 70, § 652B cmt. b, illus. 1-5.
77. Id. § 652B cmt. b.
78. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
79. Various studies have considered Internet users' privacy expectations. A common
theme discovered through these efforts is that Internet users want a guarantee of some degree
of privacy when they utilize the Internet. In addition, most Internet users favor opt-in stan-
dards for the collection of personal information, rather than the opt-out standards that are
currently endorsed by the Federal Trade Commission. See, e.g., SUSANNAH FOX ET AL., PEW
INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, TRUST AND PRIVACY ONLINE: WHY AMERICANS WANT TO
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Fletcher v. Price Chopper Foods of Trumann, Inc.80 is a recent case
from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit applying
Arkansas law regarding the privacy tort of intrusion upon seclusion. In
Fletcher, the court clarified that this tort consists "[o]f three parts: (1) an
intrusion (2) that is highly offensive (3) into some matter in which a person
has a legitimate expectation of privacy."'
Regarding the intrusion element, the court stated that an intrusion oc-
curs when an actor "believes, or is substantially certain, that he lacks the
necessary legal or personal permission to commit the intrusive act. ' 2 The
placement of a cookie on one's hard drive requires a physical intrusion. The
question then remains whether or not companies such as DoubleClick lack
the legal or personal permission to commit this act. The distinction between
legal and personal permission is significant.8 3 Even if existing federal legis-
lation does not prohibit intrusive acts, these acts should not occur absent the
personal permission of the Internet user.
The second element of this tort requires an act that is highly offensive.
While the collection of names, addresses, and other public information may
not be highly offensive,84 the collection of certain information regarding
consumers could be highly offensive to a reasonable person. For example,
an Internet user may access a medical Web site seeking information regard-
ing an illness she has contracted. Assuming the Internet user does not wish
to disclose the facts of her illness, the disclosure of the fact that she visited
the medical Web site could be highly offensive.
REWRITE THE RULES 2 (Aug. 20, 2000), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/reports/
pdfs/PIP_Trust_PrivacyReport.pdf.
80. 220 F.3d 871 (8th Cir. 2000).
81. Id. at 875-76.
82. Id. at 876 (quoting O'Donnell v. United States, 891 F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1989)).
83. If an E-tailer lacks either legal or personal permission to collect personal informa-
tion imbedded within a cookie, then the E-tailer has arguably satisfied the intrusion element.
A report issued by the Pew Internet and American Life Project determined that eighty-six
percent of Internet users support an opt-in provision. FOX ET AL., supra note 79, at 2. Thus,
the vast majority of users do not give E-tailers personal permission to collect personal infor-
mation simply by virtue of the fact that a Web site has been visited. See id. Opt-in provisions
serve as appropriate mechanisms by which Internet users may notify E-tailers that personal
permission to collect specified personal information has been granted. The Pew report echoes
the argument of Warren and Brandeis:
The common law secures to each individual the right of determining, ordinarily,
to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to
others .... [I]f he has chosen to give them expression, he generally retains the
power to fix the limits of the publicity which shall be given them.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 198.
84. The Restatement echoes this theme: "Thus there is no liability for the examination
of a public record concerning the plaintiff .... " RESTATEMENT, supra note 70, § 652B cmt.
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The third element of the intrusion upon seclusion tort requires the con-
sumer to have a legitimate expectation of privacy. As the Fletcher court
stated, "A legitimate expectation of privacy is the touchstone of the tort of
intrusion upon seclusion." 85 In order to have a legitimate expectation of
privacy, Internet users must conduct themselves in a manner consistent with
an actual expectation of privacy. According to the Fletcher court, "a per-
son's behavior may give rise to an inference that he no longer expects to
maintain privacy in some aspect of his affairs.,
86
Comment b of the Restatement affirms this principle that a person's
behavior serves as evidence of whether or not that person has an expectation
of privacy. Comment b clarifies that the invasion must be "over the plain-
tiffs objection., 87 Companies such as DoubleClick who offer "opt-out"
provisions would argue that the placement of cookies was not over the
plaintiff's objection. If plaintiffs object, they may simply opt out. For ex-
ample, the DoubleClick Web site educates interested consumers, and ex-
plains to them how they may opt out.88 However, while many consumers are
concerned about their privacy with regard to their use of the Internet, some
consumers are simply unaware that their privacy is at risk and are unaware
that they may opt out.
The fact that a consumer could prevent any invasion by utilizing an
opt-out mechanism, but fails to do so, should not bar recovery. For example,
the second illustration in Comment b of Restatement section 652B states:
"A, a private detective seeking evidence for use in a lawsuit, rents a room in
a house adjoining B's residence, and for two weeks looks into the windows
of B's upstairs bedroom through a telescope taking intimate pictures with a
telescopic lens. A has invaded B's privacy.', 89 In this illustration, B could
certainly prevent A from invading B's privacy. B could install and close
blinds, blocking the view through B's window. Or, B could simply avoid
rooms with windows. The fact that B has not done so should not imply that
B has no legitimate expectation of privacy. Likewise, if a computer user
perceives the placement of cookies to be an invasion of privacy, and fails to
utilize an opt-out provision, this should not bar recovery.
Many privacy advocates, as well as several proposed federal laws, ar-
gue that companies such as DoubleClick must provide "opt-in" rather than
"opt-out" opportunities. The distinction is significant. By requiring an opt-in
85. Fletcher, 220 F.3d at 877.
86. Id. (quoting Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994)).
87. RESTATEMENT, supra note 70, § 652B cmt. b.
88. DoubleClick, **Ad Cookie Opt-Out**, at http://www.doubleclick.com/us/corporate/
privacy/privacy/ad-cookie/default.asp?asp_object l=d (last visited Feb. 10, 2002); see also
DoubleClick, Privacy Policy: Brief Overview, at http://www.doubleclick.com/us/corporate/
privacy/privacy/default.asp?aspobject l=& (last updated Nov. 19, 2001).
89. RESTATEMENT, supra note 70, § 652B cmt. b, illus. 2.
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provision, only those consumers who acquiesce to the use of cookies will
participate. If the law merely requires an opportunity to opt out, the privacy
of many unassuming Web surfers will be compromised.
B. Appropriation of Name or Likeness
Olan Mills Inc. v. Dodd,90 the first Arkansas case to recognize the inva-
sion of privacy tort in Arkansas, was based upon an appropriation theory.
9'
In Olan Mills, the plaintiff sought the services of Olan Mills Photography,
wanting to give a photograph of herself to her daughter. Once the photo-
graph was taken, the plaintiff assumed "the transaction was closed., 92 How-
ever, the transaction was far from closed. Olan Mills affixed the plaintiffs
photograph to 150,000 advertising post cards that were published and dis-
tributed throughout Arkansas and surrounding states without the plaintiffs
prior knowledge or consent.93 In addition to the postcards, Olan Mills's
door-to-door salespersons carried enlargements of the plaintiffs photograph
to solicit orders. 94 The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the jury's unani-
mous verdict of $2500.95 The Court refused to further develop the appro-
priation tort in this case, limiting the opinion to the particular facts of the
case.
96
Since Clan Mills, the Arkansas courts have had little opportunity to
consider the appropriation tort. One of the few appropriation cases applying
Arkansas law is Stanley v. General Media Communications, Inc.9 7 The
Stanley case is factually unique, to say the least. The plaintiffs were two
female high school juniors who voluntarily participated in a contest in a
pavilion on the beach in Panama City. 98 Defendant General Media later pub-
lished a photograph of the fully clothed plaintiffs, taken during the contest,
in Penthouse magazine. 99
90. 234 Ark. 495, 353 S.W.2d 22 (1962).
91. See id., 353 S.W.2d at 22.
92. Id. at 496, 353 S.W.2d at 23.
93. Id., 353 S.W.2d at 23.
94. Id., 353 S.W.2d at 23.
95. Id. at 499, 353 S.W.2d at 24.
96. Olan Mills, 234 Ark. at 498, 353 S.W.2d at 24 ("It is unnecessary to develop in
greater detail the nature of the cause of action; because our opinion herein is limited to the
particular facts of this case and the extent of the damages here awarded.").
97. 149 F. Supp. 2d 701 (W.D. Ark. 2001).
98. Id. at 704. According to the court, "The contest rules required each participant to
place a blindfold over her eyes, unwrap a condom, and place the condom on a 'demonstrator'
.... The winner of the contest was the participant who finished the task in the shortest
amount of time." Id.
99. Id.
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The plaintiffs filed suit, alleging libel, intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, and the invasion of privacy torts of appropriation and false
light.1t ° The plaintiffs' invasion of privacy claims were dismissed on sum-
mary judgment. 101 The court began its analysis of the appropriation claim by
quoting from Restatement section 652C, which "provides that '[o]ne who
appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy.",
0 2
Claiming that appropriation requires the commercial use of a person's
name or likeness,'0 3 the court relied heavily on the fact that Penthouse ap-
parently did not capitalize on the plaintiffs' likeness to sell copies of its
magazine.1°4 The court noted that the photo depicted plaintiffs as either fully
clothed or wearing a swimsuit, sitting behind a table, and laughing or smil-
ing. Without so claiming, but perhaps taking judicial notice, the court ex-
plained, "Given the content of the publication as a whole, the Court is con-
fident that no reasonable jury could conclude that Penthouse magazine in-
tended or expected that patrons would buy the magazine on the basis of the
photo at issue."'' 0 5 Penthouse's use of the photograph can clearly be distin-
guished from the use made of personal information collected by companies
such as DoubleClick. DoubleClick and its competitors do capitalize on
Internet users' personal information in order to gain commercial advan-
tage.1
06
Comment b to § 652C of the Restatement addresses the question of
how one's name or likeness may be appropriated. 0 7 The comment states,
"The common form of invasion of privacy under the rule here stated is the
100. Id.
101. Id. at 708.
102. Id. at 706 (quoting RESTATEMENT § 652C).
103. Stanley, 149 F. Supp. 2d at 706. Curiously, the Restatement, which has been adopted
and cited with approval many times by Arkansas courts, does not limit the tort of appropria-
tion to commercial appropriation cases:
Apart from statute, however, the rule stated is not limited to commercial appro-
priation. It applies also when the defendant makes use of the plaintiff's name or
likeness for his own purposes and benefit, even though the use is not a commer-
cial one, and even though the benefit sought to be obtained is not a pecuniary
one.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 70, § 652C cmt. b.
104. Stanley, 149 F. Supp. 2d at 706 ("More importantly, there is no evidence that Pent-
house capitalized on the Plaintiffs' likeness to sell copies of its 25th Anniversary Edition.").
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., Jessica J. Thrill, The Cookie Monster: From Sesame Street to Your Hard
Drive, 52 S.C. L. REv. 921, 945 (2001) ("Websites gather information using cookies in order
to create an individual's profile. Once the profile is complete, the Web site utilizes the user's
identity to its advantage-it is either used to create individualized advertising or sold to other
companies for profit.").
107. RESTATEMENT, supra note 70, § 652C cmt. b.
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appropriation and use of the plaintiffs name or likeness to advertise the
defendant's business or product, or for some similar commercial pur-
pose.'' 8 The Stanley court expressly concluded that the defendant, General
Media Communications Inc. (the publisher of Penthouse), did not use the
photograph for the purposes of advertising the defendant's product.1
0 9
DoubleClick's use of personal information is another matter. The very
purpose of DoubleClick seemingly involves the appropriation and use of
personal information regarding consumers. DoubleClick specializes in col-
lecting, compiling, and analyzing information about Internet users through
proprietary technologies and techniques." 0 DoubleClick creates value for its
customers by building detailed profiles of Internet users.111
Businesses such as DoubleClick claim that the nonconsensual dissemi-
nation of personal information does not amount to appropriation. At first
glance, three cases seem to support this position. Shibley v. Time, Inc,"
12
Dwyer v. American Express Co.," 3 and U.S. News & World Report v. Avra-
hami 1 4 involve the defendants' nonconsensual dissemination of the plain-
tiffs' personal information. In each case the plaintiffs were denied recovery
under an appropriation theory.
A brief consideration of Dwyer may prove helpful." 5 In Dwyer, the
plaintiff sued American Express alleging that the company's policy of com-
piling and selling lists of card members' names and addresses amounted to
the tort of appropriation." 6 At first glance, the activities of American Ex-
press and DoubleClick appear quite similar. Both companies compile and
sell personal information regarding consumers, often without consumers'
consent. Because of the similarity of these actions, one might expect similar
treatment of their activities under the law.
However, the activities are quite distinct. In Dwyer, following the rea-
soning in Shibley, the court claimed there is little to no value in one name,
expressly stating, "a single, random cardholder's name has little or no in-
108. Id.
109. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
110. In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litigation, 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
111. Id.
112. 341 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).
113. 652 N.E.2d 1351 (Iil. App. Ct. 1995).
114. No. 96-203, 1996 WL 1065557 (Va. Cir. Ct. June 13, 1996).
115. See 652 N.E.2d 1351.
116. Id. at 1353. The court explained the process as follows:
In order to characterize its cardholders, defendants analyze where they shop and
how much they spend, and also consider behavioral characteristics and spending
histories. Defendants then offer to create a list of cardholders who would most
likely shop in a particular store and rent that list to the merchant. Defendants
also offer to create lists which target cardholders who purchase specific types of
items, such as fine jewelry.
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trinsic value to defendants (or a merchant). Rather, an individual name has
value only when it is associated with one of defendants' lists. Defendants
create value by categorizing and aggregating these names."' 17 DoubleClick,
on the other hand, creates tremendous value for itself and for other mer-
chants using a single name. 118 DoubleClick collects information regarding
individuals that is valuable to DoubleClick and its clients regardless of
whether or not that individual has been categorized or aggregated as part of
any list.
C. Publicity Given to Private Life
According to the Restatement, "One who gives publicity to a matter
concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for
invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized ... (a) would be highly of-
fensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the
public."' 9 Arkansas courts have simply not had the occasion to develop this
tort. 1
20
Nonetheless, an analysis of the Restatement sheds light on how Arkan-
sas courts might resolve complaints alleging a public disclosure of private
facts. Four questions must be asked in order to determine whether or not
this tort has been committed. Was the matter publicized? m2' If so, did the
matter publicized involve the private life of another? 22 If so, was the publi-
cation highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable person?123 If so, was the
117. Id. at 1356.
118. See In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litigation, 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
119. RESTATEMENT, supra note 70, § 652D.
120. See Milam v. Bank of Cabot, 327 Ark. 256, 937 S.W.2d 653 (1997). In Milam, the
plaintiffs' complaint alleged, among other things, invasion of privacy. Id. at 259, 937 S.W.2d
at 654-55. While the facts of the case could have given rise to an allegation based on public
disclosure of private facts, the Milams's failure to plead with specificity was fatal. Thus, the
court affirmed summary judgment, and refused to address the public disclosure tort, stating
that:
the Milams do not state which theory of privacy invasion applies to their case. It
is also difficult to ascertain both from the complaint and from the Milams' ar-
gument whether the invasion was caused by the alleged acquisition of the finan-
cial information from the bank by Thompson or Thompson's alleged communi-
cation of it to the railroad policemen. In addition, the Milams do not cite any au-
thority to support violation of their privacy rights, and we decline to research
this point for them .... In sum, we will not develop this claim for the Milams.
That was their responsibility. A conclusory allegation by the Milams is not suffi-
cient to ward off summary judgment.
Id. at 264, 937 S.W.2d at 657 (internal citations omitted).
121. RESTATEMENT, supra note 70, § 652D cmt. a.
122. Id. at cmt. b.
123. Id. at cmt. c.
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matter of legitimate public concern?' 2 4 If the answers to the first three ques-
tions are yes, and the answer to the fourth question is no, then a plaintiff has
a cause of action for publication of private facts. An argument could be
made that the dissemination to third parties of information collected by
DoubleClick in the form of cookies amounts to the public disclosure of pri-
vate facts.
If an Internet user were to sue DoubleClick, publicity would likely be
the most challenging element to prove. The Restatement clearly distin-
guishes the "publicity" element of a public disclosure claim from the "pub-
lication" element of a defamation claim. 25 For purposes of defamation,
publication includes any communication by the defendant to a third per-
son.1 26 However, publicity, as an element of the public disclosure tort, re-
quires:
that the matter is made public, by communicating it to the public at
large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substan-
tially certain to become one of public knowledge .... On the other
hand, any publication.. . in a handbill distributed to a large number of
persons... is sufficient to give publicity within the meaning of the term
as it is used in this Section. The distinction, in other words, is one be-
tween private and public communication.
1 27
Assuming the Web company declines to disclose the information col-
lected to an outside source, the publicity element is likely to fail. However,
if the Web company gives, loans, or sells this information to a third party
advertiser, the publicity element may be satisfied.
Assuming the matter was publicized, did the matter involve the private
life of another? Generally, if a Web site only collects information that is of
public record, no cause of action will lie for public disclosure of private
facts. 128 However, the disclosure of non-public information is not authorized
by the Restatement, and should remain private.
29
Was the publication highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable per-
son? The Restatement observes, "The protection afforded to the plaintiffs
interest in his privacy must be relative to the customs of the time and place,
124. Id. at cmt. d.
125. Id. at cmt. a.
126. Id. Thus, the disclosure of a defamatory statement from DoubleClick to a client of
DoubleClick would satisfy the publication element for a defamation claim.
127. RESTATEMENT, supra note 70, § 652D cmt. a.
128. Id. The Restatement explains that "[t]here is no liability for giving publicity to facts
about the plaintiffs life that are matters of public record, such as the date of his birth, the fact
of his marriage." Id. at cmt. b.
129. See Thrill, supra note 106, at 939 ("[U]nless the data collected by cookies is a mat-
ter of accessible public record, information not voluntarily disclosed by an individual should
remain private and secret.").
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to the occupation of the plaintiff and to the habits of his neighbors and fel-
low citizens."'130 The Restatement appears to support the argument that what
is today highly offensive may not be so tomorrow. If today's Internet users
have a legitimate expectation of privacy during their use of the Internet,
then perhaps the publication would be highly offensive. Clearly, the publi-
cation of certain information (such as one's access to a medical Web site) is
more offensive than the publication of other information (such as one's
name).
Finally, the plaintiff must prove that the information publicized was
not of a legitimate public concern.1 31 Addressing this issue indirectly, the
United States Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment prohibits
the recovery for disclosure of and publicity to facts that are of public re-
cord. 13 2 The Court has indicated that an invasion of privacy claim cannot be
maintained where the subject matter of the publicity involves a matter of
"legitimate concern to the public."'133 Obviously the public benefits from the
free flow of information. Nonetheless, this appreciation for information
should not unduly jeopardize an individual's right to privacy. An individ-
ual's mouse clicks are simply not a matter of legitimate public concern.
D. Publicity Placing a Person in False Light
According to the Restatement, publicizing information that sheds "false
light" on another creates liability to the one so injured for invasion of his
privacy, if a reasonable person would find the "false light" "highly offen-
130. RESTATEMENT, supra note 70, § 652D cmt. c.
131. Id. at cmt. d.
132. Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); see also RESTATEMENT, supra
note 70, § 652D cmts. c-d.
133. Cox, 420 U.S. at 492. In Lewis v. Harrison School Dist. No. 1, a federal case arising
out of Arkansas, the court addressed the issue of what is and is not a legitimate concern to
the public. 621 F. Supp. 1480 (W.D. Ark. 1985). The plaintiff, a principal in the Harrison
School district, filed suit alleging retaliatory discharge in violation of his First Amendment
rights. The plaintiff claimed he was fired for publicly disagreeing with the superintendent's
decision to transfer the plaintiff's wife. Though the Lewis court focused on free speech rather
than invasion of privacy issues, it acknowledged that "[w]hether expression is of a kind that
is of legitimate concern to the public is also the standard in determining whether a common
law action for invasion of privacy is present." Id. at 1486 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138, 143 (1983)). The court noted that whether or not a statement is of legitimate con-
cem to the public is determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement. Id.
The court concluded that the plaintiff's speech was not of a legitimate concern to the public
because it was "'primarily the expression of personal invective' rather than legitimate input
into matters of current public concern." Id. at 1489. Again quoting Connick, the court ex-
plained that if an "expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of politi-
cal, social, or other concern to the community," then an expression is likely not of public
concern. Id. at 1486 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 146). Thus, the argument that a person's
lawful Internet use is of any political, social, or other concern to the community lacks merit.
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sive," and if the actor either knew or showed "reckless disregard" concern-
ing the "falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other
would be placed."1
34
It appears highly unlikely that a plaintiff could successfully allege a
false light cause of action against a defendant who utilized cookies for ad-
vertising purposes. Suppose a defendant uses information contained in a
cookie to place the plaintiff in a false light that would be highly offensive to
a reasonable person. While this action would satisfy the first element of the
false light tort, the plaintiff would still struggle mightily to prevail on a false
light claim. To satisfy the second element of this tort in Arkansas, courts
require a showing of actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. 3' The
defendant who utilizes cookies would have acted in reliance on action taken
by or information submitted by the plaintiff. Given the fact that information
contained in cookies is derived from the user, or potential plaintiff, a false
light claim appears nearly impossible to construct.
V. CONCLUSION
Considering once again the introductory anachronism of Samuel War-
ren and Louis Brandeis surfing the Internet, what words of wisdom might
they impart today? What would they conclude about an E-tailer's use of
cookies to collect personal information? Presumably, they would appreciate
the Internet's potential for tremendous societal benefit. However, they
would temper this appreciation with a concern regarding the Internet's pro-
found potential for compromising the personal privacy of millions of Inter-
net users. Until more expansive federal legislation is enacted to protect
Internet users, Warren and Brandeis might once again seek protection under
the common law.
Does an Internet user have a remedy to combat possible violations of
privacy? If asked this question, perhaps Warren and Brandeis would con-
clude today, as they did in 1890: "Has he then such a weapon? It is believed
that the common law provides him with one, forged in the slow fire of the
centuries, and today fitly tempered to his hand."'' 3 6 The century-old words
of Warren and Brandeis are no less applicable today. Perhaps today's
weapon is the common law invasion of privacy tort.
134. RESTATEMENT, supra note 70, § 652E.
135. Peoples Bank & Trust v. Globe Int'l Publ'g, Inc., 978 F.2d 1065 (8th Cir. 1992);
Stanley v. Gen. Media Communications, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 701 (W.D. Ark. 2001);
Dodson v. Dicker, 306 Ark. 108, 812 S.W.2d 97 (1991); Dodrill v. Ark. Democrat Co., 265
Ark. 628, 590 S.W.2d 840 (1979).
136. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 220.
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